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UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE SCHOOL OF LAW CENTER
ON APPLIED FEMINISM'S 8 TH ANNUAL FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY CONFERENCE ON APPLIED FEMINISM AND
WORK: KEYNOTE SPEAKER CHAI FELDBLUM,
COMMISSIONER, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION
Below is a transcript of the keynote speech from the University of
Baltimore School of Law Center on Applied Feminism 8 h Annual
Feminist Legal Conference: Applied Feminism and Work. Chai
Feldblum, Commissioner of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), gave the keynote speech on Friday,March 6,
2015.
CHAI FELDBLUM*:
I'm thrilled to be here. I can't say how cool it is to be at a law
school that has a Center on Applied Feminism. How many law
schools have that? And given, as you heard, I'm a commissioner at
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that cares about
having fair and just work, to be at a conference on applied feminism
and work.
This is also an important year for the Commission itself. Fifty
years ago, in July, our Commission opened its doors for the first time
and started to help implement Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. That Title of the law prohibited employers from discriminating
on a range of characteristics, including sex.
So, what I want to talk about now, is gender equity in employment,
and I'm hoping that it will be a useful way of kicking off what looks
like a really incredible agenda for the day. So here's the framework I
want to use in talking about this. I believe that to achieve any social
justice outcome one needs three variables to converge: law, policies
and practice, and social norms. Now by law, I mean a law that's
passed by a legislature, the regulations and guidance that agencies
might issue to implement that law, and then court decisions that
might be handed down interpreting that statute, regulations, guidance.
Lots of words. By policies and practice, I mean how and whether
* This address was transcribed by University of Baltimore Law Review staff editors.
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those words of the law have actually been absorbed into the sinews of
an organization. Are the requirements of the law, whatever the law
is, actually reflected in the daily practices of whatever organization is
governed by that law? Or are they still just words? And by social
norms, I mean what the majority of people feel and think about the
social justice outcome trying to be achieved by these laws and
policies. Because until a tipping point of a majority of people in a
country governed by those laws actually believe that the social
outcome being achieved, being sought by those laws is a good thing,
that social justice outcome will not be fully realized. How much in
the hearts and minds of the people in a country is that social outcome
seen as a good thing?
Now, by the way, these three elements are interrelated. There's
like a dynamic dance that happens between them. So assume that the
social justice outcome being sought, to be achieved, is equal
treatment in the workplace. Well, we often need a law in place in
order to get employers to put policies and practice that will prohibit
the discrimination, right? If that law is absorbed into the sinews of
that employment setup, you'll get often those policies and practice.
Once you have those policies and practices in place, that can affect
the way that co-workers think about that goal. Should there be equal
rights for African Americans, for women, for people of particular
religious beliefs? And, that can then affect the hearts and minds of
those people. And then if that happens, that can then make the law
more effective, because employers then find it easier to both
understand and comply with the law, which then again has the cycle
to changing social norms.
So let's think about this framework in terms of the antidiscrimination provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
as it applies to sex discrimination because, of course, that's the first
variable, law; the law that's passed by Congress. Now, as many of
you may know, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, when it was first
introduced, did not include sex among the various characteristics.
It's the reason why, in other titles of the Civil Rights Act, sex is not
included. So the title of the Civil Rights Act that applies to public
accommodations, sex isn't there. The title that applies to entities that
get federal funds, sex isn't there. It's there in the employment
section. Now the myth has arisen that Congress had never dealt with,
had never even thought about, the issue of sex discrimination until
sex was suddenly added to Title VII on the floor of the House by a
congressman who opposed the Civil Rights Act and offered that
amendment solely to kill the bill, the poison pill. Now there are some
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elements of truth to this story. There always are some elements for
any myth to arise. But mostly it's wrong.
The reality is that Congress had been debating the issue of sex
discrimination, on and off, for over forty years at that point. Now, it
had not been having that debate in the context of an employment law
that would govern private employers. It had been having that debate
in the context of a proposed Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the
federal Constitution. The National Women's Party had been pushing
for an ERA since the 1920's. By the 1940's, the language of the
proposed Amendment read as follows: "Equality of rights under the
law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
state on account of sex." So that Amendment, if adopted, would have
meant there could be no federal or state law that denied or abridged
equality of rights on account of sex.
Now the ERA, as you all know, was not passed by Congress, and
was not sent to the states until many years later, and which ultimately
ratification by the states failed. Now the reason for non-passage of
the ERA was that, in 1950, various women's groups and unions
prevailed over Congress to add a second sentence to the ERA. This
second sentence read as follows: "The provisions of this Article shall
not be construed to impair any rights, benefits, or exemptions
conferred by law upon persons of the female sex." So the first
sentence of the Amendment said, no law may take sex into account,
and the second sentence said, yes law can take sex into account if
they confer rights, benefits, or exemptions just to women.
So what was going on here? A combination of practical politics
and social norms. As a matter of social norms, the assumption was
that women were really different than men because their real jobs
were to be wives and mothers, not to be workers within labor market.
They might be forced into the labor market for reasons like-hello-make money. But that wasn't their real job. And as a practical
political matter, unions and women's groups had successfully gotten
labor laws enacted in various states, and most importantly, upheld
against constitutional challenge, by having these protective labor
laws protect only women, on the grounds that women were truly
different than men. So, for example, they had gotten laws enacted
that put a limit on the maximum number of hours that women could
work, or provided premium overtime pay just for women, because the
real job of women was to be wives and mothers, and these laws
would help them do that by limiting their hours. These groups did
not want an ERA to pass that would invalidate those laws. The
National Women's Party had no interest in an ERA that would add
the second sentence. So it passed.
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Thirteen years later, 1963, Title VII is introduced without a sex
discrimination prohibition. The National Women's Party saw this as
an opportunity; let's get a sex discrimination prohibition into this law
that's moving through, into this bill that's moving through Congress.
The National's Women's Party specifically asked Congressman
Howard Smith, a conservative Southern congressman who opposed
the Civil Rights Act generally, to offer the amendment of adding sex
to Title VII because Congressman Smith had been the person who
had been introducing the ERA into Congress, every congress, for that
past number of decades. Now, as a political matter, of course they
assumed he might bring along votes of other members of Congress
who, like Smith, opposed the Civil Rights Act. So many of those
who voted would have assumed it to be a poison pill. But at least a
number of members voted to add sex because they thought it was the
right thing to do. In fact, eleven out of the twelve then women
members of Congress--okay, think about that, twelve women
members of Congress in 1963-eleven out of those twelve voted to
add sex to the law, to the bill. And the sex provision stayed in the bill
through various Senate machinations, which is interesting in its own
right.
But here's the really interesting thing. The words became part of
the law. But because social norms were not yet at a place where
women and men were actually considered to be the same for
purposes of employment, the EEOC, the agency created by Title VII
to implement the law and subsequently the parts, found it hard to
accept the words of Title VII with regard to sex at face value. It's
almost like they couldn't really believe that employers could not take
sex into account. For example, in September 1965, just a few months
after the EEOC opened its doors in June 1965, the Commission
announced its position that sex segregated advertisements were not
illegal under Title VII. Now the general practice at that time was to
have male and female columns in the "Help Wanted" section of the
newspapers. There used to be things called newspapers, and there
were a list of jobs under a "Man Wanted" heading and a "Women
Wanted" heading. The EEOC decided that this practice did not
violate Title VII because the personal inclinations of men and women
were such that many job categories were primarily of interest only to
men or to women. So segregating ads by sex was not discrimination.
They were simply helping applicants find what they were looking for
anyway. Now obviously, the EEOC explained, if a woman applied
for a job in the Men Wanted column or if a man applied for a job in
the Women Wanted column, which just happened all the time, the
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law prohibited an employer from not hiring that person because of
that person's sex. But the sex-segregated ads themselves were fine.
Now this decision by the EEOC so outraged various women's
rights advocates, including the ones who had been afraid to have this
in the law in the first place because they thought it would poison, you
know, bring the law down, were furious at the EEOC's decision.
That decision actually became the catalyst for the creation of the
National Organization for Women (NOW). Now if you go onto
NOW's website and look under History, you will see they describe
this decision by the EEOC as the reason for their founding. One of
their first victories was to get the EEOC to change its position on sexsegregated ads. After this inauspicious start, the EEOC actually
emerged as a real leader in the law of sex discrimination and the
problem in actually accepting the words at face value moved to the
courts.
So how did the EEOC become a leader? Remember I said in terms
of the law, you've got the legislation that passed, but that's just the
first step. The next is what an agency does through its various tools.
Well, the Agency issued Commission decisions because they were
supposed to investigate charges and decide if there was reasonable
cause to believe there was discrimination. So they issued decisions
interpreting the law. "Yes, we think there is reasonable cause to
think discrimination exists." The Agency issued regulations and
guidance explaining what sex discrimination means. In 1972, the
Agency finally got authority to file litigation in court in its own name
and, in those cases, the EEOC also set forth its view of the law.
So here are some radical things the EEOC said the sex
discrimination provision prohibited.
It's sex discrimination if
employers won't hire married women, but they will hire married
men. It's sex discrimination if an employer won't hire women with
children under a certain age, but they do hire men with children under
a certain age. Now, these propositions may seem pretty obvious now,
but they were very contested at the time. For example, with regard to
employers' rule that they would not hire women with children below
a certain age, but would hire men regardless of the age of their
children, the Fifth Circuit held that that was not sex discrimination.
It's not sex discrimination to distinguish between male and female
applicants in that way. But why? Well, as the panel explained, they
could not imagine that members of Congress could have been so
irrational to believe that there was no difference between men and
women with small children. So whatever it was, it was not sex
discrimination, because then it would have to be prohibited, and
there's no way Congress would have prohibited that. Interesting
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legal reasoning. The Supreme Court reversed that particular ruling of
the Fifth Circuit. It was sort of hard to say that it wasn't sex
discrimination. But, you know, the law also committed employers to
restrict certain jobs to one sex or another if there was a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) for that job to be a person of a
certain sex. It's supposed to be a very narrow exception. But the
Court in that same case, after reversing the Fifth Circuit, said that it
could be a BFOQ that women not have young children, because
obviously they wouldn't be able to commit to the job in the same
way. So that was an issue for the lower courts to sort out.
Not all Commission decisions on the meaning of sex discrimination
were that positive.
For example, in the 1970's, transgender
employees and gay employees brought charges to the EEOC claiming
sex discrimination when they experienced discrimination. The
Commission concluded there was no coverage for these charges.
Whatever it was, it wasn't sex discrimination.
But the EEOC was a leader in arguing that sex stereotyping was a
violation of the law. That is, assumptions about how men and
women would act on the job, or should act on the job, that could not
be a legitimate basis for employment decisions. The EEOC said that
pretty early on. In 1989, twenty-five years after the passage of Title
VII, the Supreme Court finally endorsed that gender stereotyping
theory in a case called Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. The Court
concluded if an employer acted on the basis of a gender stereotype,
that a woman shouldn't be so aggressive or macho in the workplace,
that was sex discrimination because, as the Supreme Court said in
Price Waterhouse, "gender must be irrelevant to employment
decisions." Now that might seem like a simple sentence: "gender
must be irrelevant to employment decisions." But it was actually a
momentous statement for the Supreme Court to make because, for
almost two decades, courts had been twisting themselves into pretzels
in order to avoid that plain import of the law that sex may not be
taken into account. That's because social norms were such that not
taking gender into account seemed improbable and, indeed,
impossible.
So where are we now? Is it all over? Have sex and gender really
become irrelevant in the workplace? News flash: No! In fact, it's
sort of mind-blowing how much it's not over. We are so not where
we need to be in terms of gender equity and the workplace. So I want
to highlight a few areas where we are not where we should be and
offer some ideas for moving forward. All of these are issues that the
EEOC now is quite actively engaged with.
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First, sexual harassment. The amount of sexual harassment that is
still going on in our work places is horrific, and we see this
particularly in low-wage jobs with teenagers or immigrant women,
and we see this is non-traditional male-dominated jobs. I have to say,
when I came to the EEOC and I started seeing these cases come
across my desk, it was mind-blowing to me how much sexual
harassment still exists. So I believe we need a creative multi-pronged
strategic campaign to stop this epidemic. Law is a critical variable in
this campaign. It can make employers take notice. We can litigate
when there is significant sexual harassment. We can litigate when
women are precluded from male-dominated jobs and then experience
sexual harassment. We can litigate, but law on its own will never be
enough. To eradicate sexual harassment, governments must work in
partnership with businesses and advocacy groups to develop a proactive and creative strategy that will ultimately change the social
norm so every man, every woman, and every workplace understands
that sexual harassment is not okay.
By the way, I'm leaving this conference right now after this to go
to the second planning meeting between my office and Office of
Commissioner [Victoria A.]
Lipnic, one of the Republican
commissioners on the Commission with whom I have a very good
working bi-partisan relationship-sort of also not the norm in
Washington, D.C.-for a second planning meeting for the Select
Task Force on the Study of Harassment in the Workplace that we are
co-chairing. This is a task force that I've chaired. Jenny Yang
announced at a hearing we held about a month or so ago on
harassment in the workplace, and I want this task force to be
informed, not just by lawyers in practical practice, but also legal
academics, also social scientists. So that we have the benefit of, for
example, elements of feminist theory applied to practice and getting
something new and creative done.
Second issue: accommodations for pregnant workers. There are
pregnant workers across the country today in workplaces that need
accommodations in order to stay on the job during the course of their
pregnancy.
Particularly women who are working in manual
physically demanding jobs, which are often lower skilled, lower paid,
and they need some modified job duties, in lifting requirements, for
example, while they're on the job. Now the policy of many
employers today is to give male or female employees who have been
injured on the job these modifications-that's because they want
these folks to come back from worker's compensation so their
premiums on worker's comp don't go up-or who will give male or
female employees with a disability covered under the ADA an
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accommodation-hello, because they have to. But their policy is not
to give those same accommodations to pregnant workers. So, for
example, Peggy Young, who worked at UPS, she needed to get an
accommodation about not having to lift heavy packages, and she had
co-workers who were willing to help her. She did a type of job that
mostly she was not lifting heavy packages, but she needed that; she
didn't get it. She had to leave the job; lost her health insurance. Now
one would think, back to this first variable of law, that the law should
have been pretty clear with regards to the rights of pregnant workers
in these situations. As I noted, one of the radical decisions the
Commission issued early on was that if you discriminated against a
woman because she was pregnant, that was a form of sex
discrimination. Well, when it got to the third actor, the courts, the
Supreme Court disagreed and held pregnancy discrimination was not
a form of sex discrimination because there are a lot of non-pregnant
women in the workplace. Clearly it couldn't be a discrimination
against women. Well in response, again this dynamic circle
continuing, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978 (PDA), and that law amended Title VII to say: (1) sex included
pregnancy and (2) a second sentence in the law, a pregnant employee
must be treated the same as other employees similar in their ability or
inability to work. A year later, the Agency issues questions and
answers, guidance on PDA, basically repeats that same sense.
Well as social norms changed, women began to move more into
traditionally male-dominated jobs that actually included more
physical labor. Now pregnant women needed equal accommodations
to stay on the job, as opposed to equal access to leave, which is part
of what had generated the pregnancy cases. But as these challenges
for equal accommodations came to the courts, the courts consistently
interpreted the PDA in a way that did not require employers to make
the same accommodations, on the grounds that these other workers
who were getting accommodations were really not comparable to
pregnant workers. Now, let me tell you, the EEOC held a hearing on
this issue in February 2012. It was the first time I really read those
cases, heard this interpretation of the PDA. You know, I taught
statutory interpretation for many years at Georgetown Law. I would
have given those courts like a B-minus in their statutory
interpretation, and that's only because B-minuses are sort of the
lowest grade. So I thought, "This just can't be right."
Within the EEOC, we started working towards issuing guidance,
because again, that's one of our tools. This past June we issued
guidance that said the way we, the Agency, interpret the words of the
PDA is that you do have to provide these equal accommodations.
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We are very soon going to hear from the Supreme Court because
Peggy Young's case is in front of the Supreme Court right now, so
we will hear whether the Supreme Court agrees with the EEOC.
Now obviously, I hope they will. But regardless, having sat through
the oral arguments in Peggy Young's case, it was clear to me that the
EEOC had at least shifted the legal conversation, because every other
court, and by that point, there were five circuit courts that had ruled
that the PDA did not offer this protection. The fact that we had
intervened and issued the guidance at least meant the government
was arguing for this position. So at least it shifted the legal
conversation.
By the way, here's the power of media and social pressure. In the
brief that UPS filed with the court defending their actions, it noted
that it had changed its policy, and it was now going to offer these
accommodations to their pregnant workers. Now, mind you, they
said that it wasn't illegal that they didn't before, but, by the way,
we're going to do it now.
Now, in the interest of time, I'm going to skip my comments on
pay equity, but I will just say that it also requires a multi-prong
strategy, because while some of the wage disparity is because of
straight-out discrimination against women, a fair amount of it is
because of the gender job segregation that women and men choose to
do. While law can be one piece, we need a multi-prong strategic
issue.
But I want to conclude with a discussion of whether discrimination
based on sexual orientation and gender identity is sex discrimination
and, therefore, already prohibited under the law we have, Title VII.
Such that, while it would be great if Congress saw the light and
passed ENDA, we might be getting a protection for gay people and
transgender people under the law we currently have. So this, by the
way, is not an issue that requires a proactive multi-pronged strategy
to change social norms. Interestingly, this is a legal understanding
where the changes in cultural norms over the past decades have now
allowed us to actually interpret the words of the law as they should be
interpreted.
As I mentioned, one case that was important in the development of
the law was Price Waterhouse that recognized the idea of gender
stereotyping as a form of sex discrimination. Another important case
was Oncale [v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.], in 1998, about
ten years after Price Waterhouse, where the Supreme Court held in
an unanimous opinion same-sex sexual harassment was prohibited
under the law just like opposite sex sexual harassment. Justice
Scalia, writing for the Court, said the 1964 Congress was probably
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not thinking about same-sex sexual harassment, but as he noted, what
ultimately governs are the words of the statute, not the particular
intent of Congress.
So after Price Waterhouse and Oncale, transgender folks starting
bringing claims again in court saying that an employer discriminated
against based on the fact that they had transitioned from being a man,
if that's what they were designated at birth as, to a woman, which fit
their internal gender identity more. That was a form of sex
discrimination because the employer was acting on the stereotype
that men should stay men all through their lives; women should stay
women. They started winning in the courts, Sixth Circuit first, then
the Eleventh Circuit.
Then in April 2012, we at the EEOC issued a decision in the
federal sector. In the private sector, we had the right investigate and
ultimately litigate. In the federal sector, that is, applicants for federal
employment, federal employees, if they have the charge of discrimination, they can ultimately come to us, and we issue a decision.
In April 2012, in the case of Macy v. Departmentof Justice, we stated
discrimination based on transgender status is sex discrimination.
Now, in one way, we were just saying what courts were saying
because we noted the gender stereotyping theory. But one of the
ways, that I think, we at the Agency have moved the law forward in
this area, is we went back to Price Waterhouse, and we highlighted
the principle on which Price Waterhouse was based. That is, gender
may not be taken into account. That's the core principle.
It's not that gender stereotyping is some free-floating cause of
action. Gender stereotyping is evidence that gender has been taken
into account. But if you can prove directly that gender has been
taken into account, you don't even have to explain the cause of it. So
if someone was going to hire a person when that person was a man
and then fires the person because it turns out the person is now a
female, that is taking gender into account. What we used to call in
my office "gender on the brain," gender on the brain for whatever
reason.
Now the same analysis is starting to happen with regard to sexual
orientation. After Price Waterhouse, the courts and the EEOC began
to apply what I would call a limited gender stereotyping theory that
protected some gay men and lesbians. These courts ruled that if gay
men or lesbians violated gender stereotypes with regard to how they
dressed or walked or otherwise presented themselves and if it could
also point to explicit epithets based on that perceived gender nonconformity ("Oh, you walk like a girl," "You dress like a man"),
those gay men and lesbians could bring a claim under Title VII.
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As I used to explain, that legal reasoning would' not protect a
lesbian who looked like me. I don't violate gender assumptions
about how women should look or present themselves. Now I do of
course violate the most basic of gender assumptions, which is that
women should be sexually attracted to men, should marry men. But
you wouldn't know that I violate that basic gender assumption unless
I came out to you as a lesbian. It's amazing to me the number of
times when I speak in front of management audiences, that even
though in my bio it says that I'm the first lesbian Commissioner at
the EEOC that that just doesn't get mentioned. I mean clearly, I put
it in so I don't have a problem. I'm pretty sure it's on my website.
It's in my Twitter profile and you only have X number of words on
Twitter. [] So I often say to those management attorneys, "So how
many of you thought when I walked up here, 'Oh my goodness, that
must be the first lesbian Commissioner of the EEOC?'
Of course, if I was your employee and I told you I was a lesbian
and then I got fired because I was a lesbian, it would have been based
on the stereotype that women should not be sexually attracted to
women. And, over the past four years, even though it hasn't gotten
as much notice, the Commission has been issuing decisions
protecting gay applicants to the federal government employees on the
basis of this, what I call, robust gender-typing theory. In March
2014, a district court in D.C. [Terveer v. Billington] adopted this
gender-stereotyping theory.
But the thing is the same result can be achieved by just applying
the plain words of the statute. If an employer takes an adverse action
against a male applicant employee because that person is dating a
man, it would not take that same adverse employment action against
that same male applicant employee if that man was dating a woman.
Clearly, sex has been taken into account-"Gender on the brain."
And in September 2014, a district court in Washington, in a case
called Hall v. BNSF Railway, adopted that plain language theory. In
that case, a male employee had legally married his husband in
Washington State, applied for health insurance coverage, was denied
it, he brought a claim under Title VII alleging sex discrimination, and
the employer moved for summary judgment, citing those same
sentences that appear in lots of decisions-sexual orientation is not
covered under Title VII-hence, no case. The district court denied
summary judgment, saying [upon] reading this complaint, there's no
mention of sexual orientation. Plaintiff is arguing that, if he had been
a woman married to a man, he would have gotten the health
insurance for his spouse, but because he's a man married to a man, he
didn't get the health insurance. That's sex discrimination.
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So again, an agency moving in a certain way, courts now, at least
one, and again they are going against a whole line of precedent. But
it starts with changing the social norm, so that when gay men and
lesbians come to the EEOC, they get their charges investigated. Now
interestingly, since we've done this, we've had something like 900
charges, almost 1,000 charges. I don't think a lot of those charges are
from gay men and lesbians who actually know that we've changed
our position. I think that what's happening is those folks would
always come to the EEOC, and they were just sent away, and no
charge was filed because our investigators said we have no
jurisdiction. Now those same people are coming, and their charges
are getting investigated, and they're getting help. They're getting
help, often through settlement of those charges before they ever get to

court. []
Fifty years ago, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and set us off on a journey in which sex would not be taken
into account in the workplace, just like race, color, national origin,
and religion were not to be taken into account. This journey has not
been a simple one, and as the rest of this [symposium] will indicate, it
has not over yet. But over time, the law has increasingly been
understood to cover many forms of discrimination that the 1964
Congress could not have even anticipated.
It has generated policies and practice that have advanced gender
equity in individual workplaces across the country. The law has both
shaped and been shaped by social norms. We all need to remain part
of this great journey, and to do our bit in bringing complete equity to
our workplaces.

